We devise the first polynomial time algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium for atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and player-specific affine cost functions. Our algorithm is purely combinatorial and computes the exact equilibrium assuming rational input. The idea is to compute a pure Nash equilibrium for an associated integrally-splittable singleton congestion game in which the players can only split their demands in integral multiples of a common packet size. While integral games have been considered in the literature before, no polynomial time algorithm computing an equilibrium was known. Also for this class, we devise the first polynomial time algorithm and use it as a building block for our main algorithm.
Introduction
One of the core topics in algorithmic game theory is the complexity of computing equilibria. As pointed out by several researchers (e.g., Chen et al. [6] and Daskalakis et al. [9] ), the computational tractability of a solution concept contributes to its credibility as a plausible prediction of the outcome of competitive environments in practice. The most accepted solution concept in non-cooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium -a strategy profile, from which no player wants to unilaterally deviate. While a Nash equilibrium generally exists only in mixed strategies, the practically important class of congestion games admits pure Nash equilibria, see Rosenthal [27] . In the classical model of Rosenthal, a pure strategy of a player consists of a subset of resources, and the congestion cost of a resource depends only on the number of players choosing the same resource. Over the last decade, the algorithmic game theory community has intensively studied the complexity of computing equilibria for congestion games. As the first seminal work in this area, Fabrikant et al. [11] showed that the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete for network congestion games. Ackermann et al. [1] strengthened this result to hold even for network congestion games with linear cost functions. On the other hand, there are polynomial algorithms for symmetric network congestion games (cf. Fabrikant et al. [11] ), for matroid congestion games with player-specific cost functions (Ackermann et al. [1, 2] ), for polymatroid congestion games with player-specific cost functions and polynomially bounded demands (Harks et al. [15, 16] ) and for so-called total unimodular congestion games (see Del Pia et al. [25] ). Further results regarding the computation of approximate equilibria in congestion games can be found in Caragiannis et al. [4, 5] , Chien and Sinclair [7] and Skopalik and Vöcking [28] .
For atomic splittable congestion games, the problem of computing an equilibrium is much less explored in the literature. In such a game, there is a finite set of resources and a finite set of players. In addition, each player is associated with a positive demand and a collection of allowable subsets of resources. A strategy for a player is a (possibly fractional) distribution of the player-specific demand over the allowable subsets. This quite basic model has several applications, e.g., packet-routing in communication networks (cf. Orda et al. [24] and Korilis et al. [19, 20] ), traffic networks (Haurie and Marcotte [17] ) and logistics networks (Cominetti et al. [8] ). We are only aware of two works that derive a polynomial time algorithm for equilibrium computation: (1) For affine player-independent cost functions, there exists a convex potential whose global minima are pure Nash equilibria, see Cominetti et al. [8] . Thus, for any ǫ > 0 one can compute an ǫ-approximate equilibrium in polynomial time by convex programming methods. (2) Huang [18] also considered affine player-independent cost functions, and he devised a combinatorial algorithm computing an exact equilibrium for routing games on symmetric s-t graphs that are so-called welldesigned. This condition is met for instance by series-parallel graphs. His proof technique also uses the convex potential.
Our Results
We study atomic splittable singleton congestion games with player-specific affine cost functions and develop the first polynomial time algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium. From now on we use equilibrium as shortcut for pure Nash equilibrium. Our algorithm is purely combinatorial and computes an exact equilibrium. The main ideas and constructions are as follows. By analyzing the first order necessary optimality conditions of an equilibrium, it can be shown that any equilibrium is rational as it is a solution to a system of linear equations with rational coefficients (assuming rational input). Using that equilibria are unique for singleton games (see Richmann and Shimkin [26] and Bhaskar et al. [3] ), we further derive that the constraint matrix of the equation system is non-singular, allowing for an explicit representation of the equilibrium by Cramer's rule (using determinants of the constraint-and their sub-matrices). This way, we obtain an explicit lower bound on the minimum demand value for any used resource in the equilibrium. We further show that the unique equilibrium is also the unique equilibrium for an associated integrally-splittable game in which the players may only distribute the demands in integer multiples of a common packet size of some value k * ∈ Q >0 over the resources. While we are not able to compute k * exactly, we can efficiently compute some sufficiently small k 0 ≤ k * with the property that an equilibrium for the k 0 -integrally-splittable game allows us to determine the set of resources on which a player will put a positive amount of load in the atomic splittable equilibrium. Once these support sets are known, an atomic splittable equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time by solving a system of linear equations. This way, we can reduce the problem of computing the exact equilibrium for an atomic splittable game to computing an equilibrium for an associated k 0 -integrally-splittable game.
The class of integrally-splittable congestion games has been studied before by Tran-Tanh et al. [29] for the case of player-independent convex cost functions and later by Harks et al. [15, 16] (for the more general case of polymatroid strategy spaces and player-specific convex cost functions). In particular, Harks et al. devised an algorithm with running time n 2 m(δ/k 0 ) 3 , where n is the number of players, m the number of resources, and δ is an upper bound on the maximum demand of the players (cf. Corollary 5.2 [16] ). As δ is encoded in binary, however, the algorithm is only quasi-polynomial even for player-specific affine cost functions.
We devise a polynomial time algorithm for integrally-splittable singleton congestion games with player-specific affine cost functions. Our algorithm works as follows. For a game with initial packet size k 0 , we start by finding an equilibrium for packet size k = k 0 · 2 q for some q of order O(log(δ/k 0 )), satisfying only a part of the player-specific demands. Then we repeat the following two actions:
1. We half the packet size from k to k/2 and construct a k/2-equilibrium using the kequilibrium. Here, a k-equilibrium denotes an equilibrium for an integrally-splittable game with common packet size k. We show that this can be done in polynomial time by repeatedly performing the following operations given a k-equilibrium:
(a) Among players who can improve, we find the player that benefits most by moving one packet of size k/2;
(b) If necessary, we perform a sequence of backward-shuffles of packets to correct the load decrease caused by the first packet movement (this is called a backward path);
(c) If necessary, we perform a sequence of forward-shuffles of packets to correct the load increase caused by the first packet movement (this is called a forward path);
(a)-(c) is iterated until a k/2-equilibrium for the currently scheduled demand is reached. For strategy profile x we define ∆(x) to be a vector that contains the cost for moving one packet to the currently cheapest resource, for each combination of a player and resource. We show that after each iteration ∆(x) lexicographically increases, which implies that we converge to a k/2-equilibrium.
2.
For each player i we repeat the following step: if the current packet size k is smaller than the currently unscheduled demand of player i, we add one more packet for this particular player to the game and recompute the equilibrium. This part of the algorithm has also been used in the algorithm by Tranh-Tan et al. [29] and Harks et al. [15] .
After q iterations, we have scheduled all demands and obtain an equilibrium for the desired packet size k 0 . Polynomial running time of the algorithm is shown by several structural results on the sensitivity of equilibria with respect to packet sizes 2k and k. Specifically, we derive bounds on the difference of the resulting global load vectors as well as the individual load vectors of players. We use these insights to show that ∆(x) reaches a lexicographical maximum in a polynomial number of steps. Overall, compared to the existing algorithms of Tranh-Tan et al. [29] and Harks et al. [15] , our algorithm has two main innovations: packet sizes are decreased exponentially (yielding polynomial running time in δ) and k-equilibrium computation for an intermediate packet size k is achieved via a careful construction of a sequence of single packet movements (backward-and forward paths) from a given 2k-equilibrium (ensuring its polynomial length).
Related Work
Atomic splittable network congestion games with player-independent cost functions have been studied (seemingly independent) by Orda et al. [24] and Haurie and Marcotte [17] and Marcotte [22] . Both lines of research mentioned that Rosens' existence result for concave games on compact strategy spaces imply the existence of pure Nash equilibria via Kakutani's fixed-point theorem. Marcotte [22] proposed four numerical algorithms computing a pure Nash equilibrium and he shows local convergence results. Meunier and Pradeau [23] developed a pivoting-algorithm (similar to Lemke's algorithm) for nonatomic network congestion games with affine player-specific cost functions. Polynomial running time is, however, not shown and unlikely to hold. Gairing et al. [12] considered nonatomic routing games on parallel links with affine player-specific cost functions. They developed a convex potential function that can be minimized within arbitrary precision in polynomial time. Deligkas et al. [10] considered general concave games with compact action spaces and investigated algorithms computing an approximate equilibrium. Roughly speaking, they discretize the compact strategy space and use the Lipschitz constants of utility functions to show that only a finite number of representative strategy profiles need to be considered for obtaining an approximate equilibrium (see also Lipton et al. [21] for a similar approach). The running time of the algorithm, however, depends on an upper bound of the norm of strategy vectors, thus, implying only a quasi-polynomial algorithm for our setting.
For the problem of computing an equilibrium in classical congestion games, much more is known. In addition to the results mentioned before, Skopalik and Vöcking [28] showed that the problem of computing a ρ-approximate equilibrium is PLS-complete for any polynomially computable ρ. For symmetric congestion games, Chien and Sinclair [7] proved that a natural (1 + ρ)-improvement dynamic converges to a (1 + ρ)-approximate equilibrium after a polynomial number of steps assuming that latency functions obey the "bounded jump" property. Caragiannis et al. [4] devised the first polynomial time algorithm computing a constant factor approximative equilibrium. For affine cost functions, their algorithm computes a 2-approximation in polynomial time. Similar results have been obtained later by the same group of authors for weighted congestion games (cf. [5] ).
Preliminaries

Atomic Splittable Singleton Games
An atomic splittable singleton congestion game is represented by the tuple:
where E = {e 1 , . . . , e m } is a finite set of resources and N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players. Each player i ∈ N is associated with a demand d i ∈ Q ≥0 and a set of allowable resources E i ⊆ E. A strategy for player i ∈ N is a (possibly fractional) distribution of the demand d i over the singletons in E i . Thus, one can represent the strategy space of every player i ∈ N by polytope:
The combined strategy space is denoted by S := i∈N S i (d i ) and we denote by x = (x i ) i∈N the overall strategy profile. We define x i,e := (x i ) e as the load of player i on e ∈ E i and x i,e = 0 when e ∈ E \ E i . The total load on e is given as x e := i∈N x i,e . Resources have player-specific affine cost functions c i,e (x e ) = a i,e x e + b i,e with a i,e ∈ Q >0 and b i,e ∈ Q ≥0 for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E. The total cost of player i in strategy distribution x is defined as:
For i ∈ N , we write
The marginal cost for player i on resource e is defined as:
Lemma 2.1 (cf. Harks [14] ). Strategy profile x is an equilibrium if and only if the following holds: when x i,e > 0, then µ i,e (x) ≤ µ i,e ′ (x) for all e ′ ∈ E i .
Using that the strategy space is compact and cost functions are convex, Kakutanis' fixed point theorem implies the existence of an equilibrium. Uniqueness is proven by Richmann and Shimkin [26] and Bhaskar et al. [3] .
Game G is called symmetric whenever E i = E for all i ∈ N . We can project any asymmetric game G on a symmetric game G ′ by setting:
for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E \ E i , where:
In this case µ i,e (0) ≥ µ i,e ′ (x e ) for any e ∈ E \ E i , e ′ ∈ E i , i ∈ N and x ∈ S. Thus, in an equilibrium y for game G ′ no player i puts load on any resource e ∈ E \ E i . Hence, y is also an equilibrium for game G. In the rest of this paper we project every asymmetric game on a symmetric game using the construction above.
Integral Singleton Games
A k-integral game is given by the tuple G k := (N, E, (d i ) i∈N , (E i ) i∈N , (c i,e ) i∈N,e∈E ) with k ∈ Q >0 . Here, players cannot split their load fractionally, but only in multiples of k. Assume d i is a multiple of k, then the strategy space for player i is the following set:
In this game, k is also called the packet size. When E, N, (E i ) i∈N and (c i,e ) i∈N,e∈E are clear from the context, we will also refer to the game as G k ((d i ) i∈N ) . For player-specific affine cost functions the (discrete) marginal increase and decrease are defined as follows:
Here, µ +k i,e (x) is the cost for player i to add one packet of size k to resource e and µ
−k
i,e (x) is the cost gain for player i of removing a packet from resource e. Assuming that cost functions are affine, we obtain µ +k i,e (x) = ka i,e (x e + x i,e + k) and µ −k i,e (x) = ka i,e (x e + x i,e − k). Lemma 2.2 (cf. Groenevelt [13] ). Strategy profile x is an equilibrium in a k-integral congestion game if and only if: when x i,e > 0, then µ 
Reduction to Integrally-Splittable Games
We show that the problem of finding an equilibrium for an atomic splittable game reduces to the problem of finding an equilibrium for a k 0 -integral game for some k 0 ∈ Q >0 . Theorem 3.1. Let x be the unique equilibrium of an atomic splittable singleton game G. Then, there exists a k * ∈ Q >0 such that x is also the unique equilibrium for the k * -integral splittable game G k * .
Proof. We define the support set I i for each player as I i := {e ∈ E | x i,e > 0}. Lemma 2.1 implies that if x is an equilibrium, and x i,e > 0, x i,e ′ > 0, then µ i,e (x) = µ i,e ′ (x). Define p := i∈N |I i | ≤ nm. Then, if the correct support set I i of each player is known, the equilibrium can be computed by solving the following set of p linear equations on p variables.
1. For every player we have an equation that makes sure the demand of that player is satisfied. Thus, for each player i ∈ N we have e∈I i x i,e = d i .
From now on we refer to this set of equalities as the system Ax = b, where A is a p × p matrix. Note that as the equilibrium exists and is unique, the corresponding matrix is nonsingular. Using Cramer's Rule, the unique solution is given by:
where A i,e is the matrix formed by replacing the column that corresponds to value x i,e in A by b. We define the greatest common divisor of values a i,e , b i,e and d i as:
Then, | det(A i,e )| is an integer multiple of a p gcd and, hence, an integer multiple of a nm gcd . Thus, all player-specific loads are an integer multiple of a nm gcd /| det(A)| and, hence, if we define k * = a nm gcd /| det(A)|, x is an equilibrium for the k * -integral splittable game. Note that we can compute a gcd in running time O(nm log a max ).
It is left to prove that x is the unique equilibrium for the k * -integral splittable game. Assume on the contrary that there are two different equilibria x, y, where x is the equilibrium for the atomic splittable game. We define:
Clearly N + = ∅, and as each player distributes the same amount of load in x and y we have N + = N − . Choose a player i ∈ N + = N − , then there exist resources e and f such that x e > y e , x i,e > y i,e , x f ≤ y f and x i,f < y i,f . Then, we have:
(as x is the atomic splittable equilibrium)
This contradicts the fact that y is an equilibrium. Thus, x is the unique k * -integral splittable equilibrium.
Note that we do not know matrix A beforehand, but we do know that 2a max is an upper bound on the values occurring in A. Using Hadamard's inequality we find that
. Hence, we can find a lower bound of k * :
The idea is that for the atomic splittable equilibrium x and any k-integral-splittable equilibrium x k , there exists bounds on |x e − (x k ) e | and |x i,e − (x k ) i,e | in terms of k and m. Then, given the equilibrium for some sufficiently small k 0 , we are able compute the correct support set of each player and compute the exact equilibrium by solving system Ax = b as described earlier.
Let x be a Nash equilibrium for an atomic game and x k an equilibrium for a k-splittable game. We show that |(x k ) e −x e | < mk (Lemma 3.2) and |(x k ) i,e −x i,e | < m 2 k (Lemma 3.3).
Lemma 3.2. Let x be an equilibrium for an atomic splittable game, and x k be an equilibrium for packet size k. Then |x ′ e − x e | < mk for all e ∈ E.
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction and assume |(x k ) e − x e | ≥ mk, then there are two cases: either (x k ) e −x e ≥ mk or (x k ) e −x e ≤ −mk. We now discuss why (x k ) e −x e ≥ mk leads to a contradiction. The second case is similar, but with reversed inequalities.
Thus we assume (x k ) e − x e ≥ mk. We introduce two player sets
Then, using the player sets, we obtain:
As i∈N
and (x k ) e − x e ≥ mk, we obtain:
The total load distributed by player i does not change, therefore:
For every resource f = e we split N + e in two parts:
By definition of N + f , it holds that f =e i∈N
And thus:
As (x k ) e − x e ≥ mk and the total load in the system is the same in x and x k , we have
We add this to equation (4) to obtain f =e i∈N
By using the pigeonhole principle on the number of resources f = e, f ∈ E, there must exists an f ∈ E, f = e such that
Using the pigeonhole principle again on the number of players in
Then:
Here ≥ 1 is due to inequality (5), ≥ 2 is due to the fact that x ′ is a Nash equilibrium and > 3 is due to inequality (3). Inequality 6 now contradicts the fact that x is a Nash equilibrium.
Thus we established a bound on the difference in total load for an atomic splittable equilibrium and a k-splittable equilibrium. We use this bound on the total load to establish bounds on the difference between player specific load on a resource.
Lemma 3.3. Let x be an equilibrium for an atomic splittable game, and x k be an equilibrium for the corresponding k-splittable game. Then |(x k ) i,e −x i,e | < m 2 k for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E.
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction. Assume
We first discuss why (x k ) i,e ≥ x i,e + m 2 k leads to a contradiction. The same reasoning holds for (x k ) i,e ≤ x i,e − m 2 k, by reversing all inequalities.
Thus, we assume that (x k ) i,e ≥ x i,e +m 2 k. From Lemma 3.2 we know that (x k ) e ≥ x e −mk.
Adding both inequalities we obtain
As the total load distributed by player i does not change, and neither does the total load in the system change, we obtain:
As there are m − 1 remaining resources besides resource e, there must exist at least one resource f ∈ E such that:
Note that x i,f > 0, as x i,f = 0 implies (x k ) f < x f − mk which contradicts Lemma 3.2. We obtain:
Assuming m ≥ 2, ≥ 1 is due to inequality (8), ≥ 2 is due to the fact that x k is a Nash equilibrium and > 3 is due to inequality (7). Inequality 9, combined with the fact that x i,f > 0, contradicts the fact that x is a Nash equilibrium. Thus |(x k ) i,e − x i,e | < m 2 k for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E.
Thus, if we compute an equilibrium for a sufficiently small k 0 , this k 0 -integral-splittable equilibrium should be fairly similar to the unique k * -integral splittable equilibrium. Hence, it enables us to find the correct support sets and compute the exact atomic splittable equilibrium.
Theorem 3.4. Given an atomic splittable congestion game G and an equilibrium x k 0 for k 0 -splittable game G k 0 , where:
we can compute the exact atomic splittable equilibrium x for game G.
Proof. First note that all demands d i are integer multiples of k 0 , as d i is an integer multiple of a gcd , and both 2m 2 and ⌈(2a max ) nm (nm) nm/2 ⌉ are integer.
Theorem 3.1 implies that there exists a k * such that the atomic splittable equilibrium is also an equilibrium for the k * -integral splittable game. We make the following case distinction:
On the contrary, we assume that x i,e > 0. Remember that the atomic splittable equilibrium is also an k * -equilibrium and thus, if x i,e > 0, x i,e ≥ k * . Then we obtain:
which contradicts Lemma 3.3. Thus, x i,e = 0.
2. If (x k 0 ) i,e ≥ m 2 k 0 , then we prove that x i,e > 0. On the contrary, we assume that x i,e = 0. In this case we have (x k 0 ) i,e − x i,e ≥ m 2 k 0 , which contradicts Lemma 3.3.
Thus, x i,e > 0.
Hence, given an equilibrium (x k 0 ) for k 0 -splittable game G k 0 , we can compute the correct support sets I i for all i ∈ N , where
Given the correct support sets, we can easily compute the correct, exact equilibrium by solving the system Ax = b of at most nm linear equations in running time O((nm) 3 ).
It is left to compute an equilibrium x k 0 for integral game G k 0 with packet size:
Such integral games have been studied in the literature before, see Harks et al. [15, 16] . In particular, [16, Algorithm 1] has running time O(nm(δ/k 0 ) 3 ). Here δ is an upper bound on the player specific demands. In general, δ is not bounded in k 0 , thus, the running time is not polynomially bounded in the size of the input.
A Polynomial Algorithm for Integral Games
The goal of this section is to develop a polynomial time algorithm that computes an equilibrium for any k-splittable singleton game with player-specific affine cost functions. We use elements of [29, Algorithm 1] and [15, Algorithm 1] to construct a new algorithm with running time O(n 2 m 14 log(δ/k)). We first introduce some new notation. For two vectors x i , y i ∈ R |E| we denote their Hamming distance by H(x i , y i ) := e∈E |x i,e − y i,e |. For two resources e − , e + ∈ E with y i,e − = x i,e − − k, y i,e + = x i,e + + k and y i,e = x i,e for all e ∈ E \ {e − , e + }, we denote y i = (x i ) e − →e + . If x is a strategy profile for some game G k and y i = (x i ) e − →e + , we denote (y i , x −i ) = x i:e − →e + . We define a restricted best response: Definition 4.1. Let x be a strategy profile for game G k ((d i ) i∈N ). Assume there exists e − , e + ∈ E such that e − ∈ arg max{µ −k i,e (x)}, e + ∈ arg min{µ +k i,e (x)} and µ
. Then, we term strategy y i = (x i ) e − →e + a restricted best response to x for player i.
Note that when y i is a restricted best response to x i , H(x i , y i ) = 2k. We first describe two subroutines, termed Add and Restore.
Add
The first subroutine, Add, is described in Algorithm 1 and consists of lines 4-10 of [15, Algorithm 1] . Given an equilibrium x k for game G k ((d i ) i∈N ), it computes an equilibrium for the game, where the demand for player i is increased by k. First it decides on the best resource e ′ for player i to put her new packet. In effect, the load on resource e ′ increases and only those player with x i,e ′ > 0 can potentially decrease their cost by a deviation. In this case, Harks et al. proved in [15, Theorem 3.2] that a best response can be obtained by a restricted best response moving a packet away from e ′ . Thus, only one packet is moved throughout, preserving the invariant that only players using a resource to which the packet is moved may have an incentive to profitably deviate.
Compute a restricted best response y i ∈ S ′ i ;
The second subroutine, Restore, takes as input an equilibrium x 2k for packet size 2k and game G k ((d i ) i∈N ) , and constructs an equilibrium for packet size k. This algorithm makes use of two sub-algorithms: Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5. In Algorithm 2 we create a backward path of restricted best responses. In a backward path we are given a resource e
Find player i and resource e − q+1 satisfying properties:
while ∃i ∈ N with e − q = arg min e∈E {µ +k i,e (x b q )} and µ
In Algorithm 5 we create a forward path of restricted best responses. A forward path is very similar to a backward path, but we change the perspective. Thus, given a resource e + q and a strategy profile x f q , we check in iteration q if there exists a player that has a best response from e + q to some e + q+1 . As this algorithm is very similar to Algorithm 2, it is moved to Appendix A. Both algorithms (back-and forward path) can be seen as a special instantiation of a general restricted best response dynamic (cf. [29, 15] ).
We are now ready to define subroutine Restore. Initialize x by equilibrium x 2k . While x is not an equilibrium for G k , we iterate the following. Among players who can improve, we find the player j that benefits most from a restricted best response. We carry out a restricted best response for player j and move a packet from some resource e − 1 to some e + 1 . Then we compute a backward path, starting in resource e − 1 . If the resulting strategy profile has Hamming distance zero with x, we stop this iteration and overwrite x by the resulting strategy profile. Else, we compute a forward path, starting in e + 1 and overwrite x by the resulting strategy profile. The pseudo-code of subroutine Restore can be found in Algorithm 3.
Choose e − 1 ∈ arg max{µ −k j,e (x)} and e + 1 ∈ arg min{µ +k j,e (x)};
PacketHalver
Using the subroutines Add and Restore we develop PacketHalver, which computes an equilibrium x k 0 for the k 0 -splittable game G k 0 ((d i ) i∈N ) ). In this algorithm we start with an equilibrium
Note that this game has a trivial equilibrium, where (x k ) i,e = 0 for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E. We repeat the following two steps:
, we construct an equilibrium for G k/2 ((d ′ i ) i∈N ) using subroutine Restore and set k to k/2.
• For each player i ∈ N we check if
If so, we increase d ′ i to by k and recompute equilibrium x k using subroutine Add.
After q 1 iterations PacketHalver returns an equilibrium x k 0 for G k 0 ((d i ) i∈N ) ). The pseudo-code of PacketHalver can be found in Algorithm 4.
Input: Integral splittable congestion game 
Correctness
In this section, we prove that PacketHalver indeed returns an equilibrium for game
. In order to do so, we first need to verify that the two subroutines Add and Restore are correct. Subroutine Add is proven to be correct by Harks, Peis, and Klimm [15] , thus, it is left to verify correctness of Restore ans PacketHalver.
Correctness Restore
To verify the correctness of subroutine Restore(x 2k , G k ((d i ) i∈N ))), we need to prove that Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5 are well-defined, and that Restore terminates.
To prove that Algorithm 2 is well-defined, we need to verify that if
there exists a player i and a resource e − q+1 satisfying Property B1, B2 and B3. Proof. The proof of this lemma is omitted as it is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.1, where all inequalities are reversed.
It is left to prove that Restore terminates. We define:
Let ∆ min (x) be the minimum value in ∆(x). Note that when all elements in ∆(x) are nonnegative, or, equivalently, when ∆ min (x) is non-negative, x is an equilibrium. Our goal is to show that after each iteration in the while-loop (lines 2 -15 of Restore) ∆(x) increases according to a certain lexicographical order defined as follows. Given two vectors u, v ∈ R n , we say that v is sorted lexicographically larger than u, if there is an index k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that u φ(i) = v ψ(i) for all i < k and u φ(k) < v ψ(k) , where φ and ψ are permutations that sort u and v non-decreasingly. We write u < lex v. If u φ(i) = v ψ(i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we write u = lex v.
Proving that ∆(x) sorted lexicographically increases implies that Restore does not cycle, and thus, as the strategy space is finite, terminates. In general, under the hypothesis that ∆(x) lexicographically increases, we obtain the following strategy profiles within a while-loop (lines 2-15):
We introduce two types of vectors that help us prove that ∆(x) < lex ∆(x ′ ). Let q be the iteration in the backward path where a player moves a packet from e 
As k is fixed within Restore, we write B i,e (x)) i∈N ;e∈E .
Let q be the iteration in the forward path, where some player moves a packet from e + q to e + q+1 . We define values F q,−k i,e (x) and F q,+k i,min (x) as follows:
otherwise. otherwise.
Again, as k is fixed, we write F q,− i,e (x) and F q,+ i,min (x) instead. We define:
i,e (x)) i∈N ;e∈E .
In order to show ∆(x) < lex ∆(x ′ ), we first prove that
Lemma 5.3. Let x, x b q and x f q be strategy profiles as described in Restore, then ∆(x) < lex
Proof. We first prove that ∆(x) < lex B 1 (x b 1 ). Remember that there exists an i ∈ N such that x b 1 = x i:e
. Using Equation (10) and (11), for all players j = i, it holds that:
So, for all players j = i, we have ∆ j (x) = lex B 1 j (x b 1 ). Hence, it is left to prove that
As arg min e∈E {µ +k i,e (x b 1 )} = ∅, at least one of the following is true: (I) e ′ ∈ arg min e∈E {µ +k i,e (x b 1 )} for some e ′ ∈ E \ {e
As all three cases are proven similarly, we only will prove the first case here. Proofs for the other two cases can be found in Appendix C. For the first case, assume that e ′ ∈ arg min e∈E {µ +k i,e (x b 1 )} for some e ′ ∈ E \ {e 
(by Definition 10 and 11)
(by definition of µ +k i,min (x)) For resource e ∈ E \ e Thus when e ′ = arg min e∈E {µ
). This proof depends on three crucial factors:
• The fact that x b 1 is obtained from x, when player i moves a packet from e • This is an restricted improving move for player i (thus, µ
• The relation between µ 
Similar relations hold for x b
q , x b q+1 , B q (x) and B q+1 (x). Thus, using the same arguments as above,
Hence, the backward path and the forward path end after a finite number of steps. We need two more lemma's to connect vectors ∆(x), B q (x) and F q (x). We define:
Definition 5.4. Let α ∈ Q and y ∈ Q |I| for a finite set I. We define function #(α, y) to output the number of times that α occurs in y.
Lemma 5.5. Let x and x b q b be as in Restore, and assume that e
Proof. If for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E we have:
) and the lemma follows. Therefore, assume that for some i ∈ N and e ∈ E we have:
Using the definitions of F ), which implies:
is the end of the backward path) ). As x is not an equilibrium, ∆(x) contains a negative value that is increased by the initial best response. Thus, if
q f ) and the lemma follows. Therefore, assume that for some i ∈ N and e ∈ E we have:
Using Lemma 5.3, 5.5 and 5.6 we prove the following statement.
Lemma 5.7. Let x and x ′ be defined as in the while-loop (lines 2-15) of Restore. Then ∆(x) < lex ∆(x ′ ), and moreover, #(∆ min (x), ∆(x)) > #(∆ min (x), ∆(x ′ )).
Proof of Lemma 5.7. We first prove that ∆(x) < lex ∆(x ′ ). Lemma 5.3 implies:
If e 
We use Lemma 5.6 to obtain the desired result:
Therefore, if x and x ′ are as defined in the while-loop (lines 2-15), then ∆(x) < lex ∆(x ′ ).
For the second part of the lemma, we have:
(by Lemma 5.6 and as
As ∆(x) lexicographically increases after each loop and the strategy space S is finite, Restore terminates.
Correctness Restore
It is left to prove that PacketHalver returns an equilibrium for game
Theorem 5.8. Given a k 0 -integral splittable singleton game with affine player-specific cost functions
Proof. Strategy profile x ′ is initialized as the all-zero strategy profile, hence, an equilibrium for the game G 2 q 1 k 0 ( 0). Assume that in iteration q we enter the for-loop in PacketHalver with an equilibrium x for game G 2 q 1 −q+1 k 0 with demands
Restore computes an equilibrium for packet size 2 q 1 −q k 0 and demands
. In lines 5-10 of PacketHalver we check for each player i ∈ N if her unscheduled load satisfies
If so, we schedule one extra packet for player i using subroutine Add. Thus, after the q'th iteration in the for-loop, we obtain an equilibrium for packet size 2 q 1 −q k 0 and demands
. Hence, after the q 1 'th iteration we obtain an equilibrium for packet size 2 0 k = k and demands
Running Time
We prove that the running time of PacketHalver is polynomially bounded in n, m, log k and log δ. For this, we first need to analyze the running time of the two subroutines Add and Restore.
Running Time Add
In [16, Corollary 5.2] Harks et al. proved that it takes time nm(δ/k) 2 to execute Add. If their algorithm is applied to games with singleton strategy spaces and player-specific affine cost functions, the running time reduces to O(nm 4 ). Mainly because equilibria are not very sensitive under small changes in demands.
Lemma 6.1. Let x k be an equilibrium for game G k ((d i ) i∈N ) and let x q be the strategy profile after the q'th iteration of the while-loop described in lines 4-7. Then |(x k ) i,e −(x q ) i,e | < 2mk for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E.
Proof. On the contrary, assume that q is the first iteration in which we obtain |(x q ) i,e − (x k ) i,e | = 2mk for some i ∈ N and e ∈ E. There are two cases:
We prove that the first case leads to a contradiction. For the second case a contradiction can be obtained in a similar manner.
Harks, Peis and Klimm [15] proved that only the players using a resource whose load increased in the previous iteration may have an improving move, and if so, a best response consists in moving one packet from this resource to another one. This implies that (x k ) e ≤ (x q ) e ≤ (x k ) e + k for all e ∈ E. Thus, when assuming (x q ) i,e = (x k ) i,e + 2mk, we obtain:
Remember that the total load distributed in x q exceeds the total load distributed in x k by k, and hence f ∈E (x q ) i,e = k + f ∈E (x k ) i,e . We obtain:
The pigeonhole principle implies that there exists an f ∈ E with (
As q is the first iteration in which (x q ) i,e − (x k ) i,e = 2mk, we have x q = (x q−1 ) i:e ′ →e for some e ′ ∈ E. Using inequalities (14), (15), m > 1 and the fact that x k is an equilibrium for packet size k, we obtain:
This, combined with the fact that (x q ) i,e > (x k ) i,e ≥ 0, implies player i can decrease her cost by moving a packet from e to f . This contradicts the fact that in strategy profile x q−1 moving a packet to e is a restricted best response for player i. Moreover, the marginal cost of a packet of player i on resource e does not depend on the aggregated load x e , but only on the player-specific load x i,e .
Lemma 6.1 implies that for each player i ∈ N and each resource e ∈ E, at most 4m different marginal cost values can occur. This implies that each unit of demand for player i (m · 2m units) visits each resource (m resources) at most 4m times. Therefore the running time of Add is bounded by O(nm 4 ).
Running Time Restore
We analyze the running time of Restore. The crucial idea is that for each strategy profile y (for a game with packet size k) obtained during the execution of Restore, we have both |(y e − (x 2k ) e | ≤ 2mk (Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 6.4) and |y i,e − (x 2k ) i,e | < 2m 2 k (Lemma 6.5) for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E.
The first lemma follows trivially from the fact that H(x, x b q 1 ) ∈ {0, 2k} and H(x, x f q 2 ) ∈ {0, 2k}. Lemma 6.3. Let x 2k be an equilibrium for game G 2k and let x, x b q 1 and x f q 2 be as described in Restore for q 1 ∈ {1, . . . , q b } and q 2 ∈ {1, . . . , q f }. If |x e − (x 2k ) e | < 2mk for all e ∈ E, then |(
Lemma 6.3 is only useful when |x ′ e − (x 2k ) e | < 2mk for all x ′ obtained through the while loop. Thus, for x ′ we prove a slightly stronger result.
Lemma 6.4. Let x 2k be an equilibrium for game G 2k and let x and x ′ be as described in Restore. If |x e − (x 2k ) e | < 2mk for all e ∈ E, then |x ′ e − (x 2k ) e | < 2mk.
Proof. If x ′ e = (x 2k ) e for all e ∈ E the lemma follows trivially. Thus, assume that there exists an e such x ′ e = (x 2k ) e . By construction of x ′ , we have
}. Thus, we only need to check that
+ 2mk. For the first case we note
− 2mk. For the second case we note that
. Algorithm 5 implies that
Moreover, the difference in player-specific load on a resource between any strategy obtained during Restore and equilibrium x 2k is bounded by 2m 2 k.
Lemma 6.5. Let x 2k be an equilibrium for game G 2k and let x, x b q and x f q be as described in Restore. If |x e − (x 2k ) e | < 2mk and |x i,e − (x 2k ) i,e | < 2m 2 k for all i ∈ N and e ∈ E, then |(x b q ) i,e − (x 2k ) i,e | < 2m 2 k for all i ∈ N , e ∈ E and q ∈ {1, . . . , q b }, and |(x f q ) i,e − (x 2k ) i,e | < 2m 2 k for all i ∈ N , e ∈ E and q ∈ {1, . . . , q f }.
Proof. As the proofs for both statements are almost identical, we only prove the first statement here, which we do by using induction on q. Define e Thus, assume that |(x b q ) i,e − (x 2k ) i,e | < 2m 2 k, then we prove that |(x b q+1 ) i,e − (x 2k ) i,e | < 2m 2 k for each i ∈ N and e ∈ E. On the contrary, assume that there exists an i ∈ N and an e ∈ E such that |(x b q+1 ) i,e − (x 2k ) i,e | = 2m 2 k. There are two cases that we need to check:
We first show that case (a) leads to a contradiction. Property B2 and line 7 in algorithm 2 imply that e − q+1 ∈ arg max{µ −k
i,e (x b q )} for all q ∈ {0, . . . q b −1}. We use Lemma 6.3 to obtain:
As the total load distributed by player i is the same in x b q+1 and x 2k , and so is the total load in the system, we obtain:
((x 2k ) e + (x 2k ) i,e ) + 2m(m − 1)k.
By the pigeonhole principle, there must exist at least one resource f ∈ E such that:
We obtain:
(x 2k ) (as m ≥ 2, this follows from equation (16))
This contradicts the fact that e − q+1 = arg max{µ −k i,e (x b q )}. For the second case we prove that (x b q+1 ) i,e − (x 2k ) i,e = 2m 2 k leads to a contradiction. Note that property B1 implies that x b q+1 is not obtained from x b q through lines 3-5, but in lines 6-10 instead. Hence, e − q = arg min{µ +k i,e (x b q )}. Using similar argumentation as in the first case, we are able to show that there exists an f ∈ E \ {e − q } with µ
The bounds on the total and player-specific load enable us to prove that Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5 run in polynomial time.
Lemma 6.6. Let x 2k be an equilibrium for packet size 2k. And let x be a strategy profile for packet size k such that |(x 2k ) e − x e | < mk. We combine all previous results to prove Lemma 6.7.
Lemma 6.7. Restore has running time O(n 2 m 14 ).
Proof. The running time of Restore is dominated by the number of times we enter the while-loop, and the running time of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5. Using Lemma 6.6 we know that in each iteration, the running time of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5 is O(nm 6 ). Hence, the running time of a complete iteration is O(nm 6 ). 
Running Time PacketHalver
Finally, we prove the following theorem. Proof. Note that we picked q 1 ∈ N to be the smallest number such that 2 q 1 k 0 > d i for all player-specific demands d i . This implies that q 1 is bounded in O(log(δ/k 0 )), where δ is an upper bound on the player-specific demands. Thus, we execute lines 3-10 O(log(δ/k 0 )) times. In line 4 we call Restore, which runs in O(n 2 m 14 ). In line 5 − 9 we execute Add (which runs in O(nm 6 )) at most n times. Thus, the computation time of lines 5 − 10 is O(n 2 m 6 ). This implies that it takes time O(n 2 m 14 ) to go through a complete iteration in the for loop. Thus, PacketHalver runs in time O(n 2 m 14 log(δ/k 0 )).
It is left to show that in an atomic splittable game G, log(1/k 0 ) is polynomially bounded in the input.
Which is indeed polynomial in the size of the input. Remember that if we are computing an atomic splittable equilibrium, we first compute the k 0 splittable equilibrium using the algorithm above. Second, we compute the exact equilibrium in time O((nm) 3 ). Thus, given game G, we can compute an atomic splittable equilibrium for G in running time: Find player i and resource e + q+1 satisfying properties: Full proof of Lemma 5.1. We introduce two player sets N + e , N − e for every resource e ∈ E, where:
A Forward Path of Restricted Best Responses
Note that for every i ∈ N + e we have:
Using the player sets, we obtain:
) ≤ 0, we have:
The total load distributed by a player does not change, therefore:
For every resource f ∈ E \ {e − q } we split N Using the definition of N + f , we obtain:
As (x 2k ) e We add this to equation (19) to obtain the following: By using the pigeonhole principle on the number of resources f ∈ E \ {e − q }, there exists an f ∈ E \ {e − q } such that: 
We combine Equation (18), Equation (20) and the fact that x is an equilibrium for packet size k to obtain:
Define e (by Definition (10) and (11)) For resource e For resource e ∈ E \ {e For resource e ∈ E \ {e 
